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Aircraft system development has been steadily increasing in cost since the 
inception of human flight.  Several factors have influenced this including economics, 
increasing complexity and increased customer expectations and requirements.  In 
addition, the contractors which produce these systems have almost consistently been 
unable to complete them within the originally contracted budget and schedule.  
The factors which influence cost increase have been studied extensively by 
industry, government and private organizations and a study of those findings will be 
conducted in the following work with the intention of determining the factors which are 
primarily responsible for cost increase in aircraft acquisition programs.  Following the 




identifying the methods with which systems engineering can be used to improve the 
process at the system and program level.  The intent will be to show how improved 
techniques for managing programs, meeting customer requirements and improving cost 
estimates can be implemented to manage cost growth.  The ultimate goal of this study is 
to show that program risk can and should be managed more effectively and that high 
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Cost increase in aircraft programs is a big topic in the media today.  During the 
recent U.S. Presidential Election the new Lockheed Martin / Augusta-Westland VH-71 
Presidential Helicopter became a hot issue during an election year rocked by a large scale 
recession (Colvin, Reuters).  The VH-71 Presidential Helicopter which had suffered a 
cost over-run of 50% was cancelled in 2009 as a statement against “Government 
Procurement Run Amok” (Drew, NYT; Colvin, Reuters). 
In RAND Report MG696 Mark V. Arena summarizes the state of Military 
Aircraft Procurement by quoting Norman Augustine as saying: 
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. The 
aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days per week 
except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra 
day. 
Augustine, a former president and CEO of Lockheed Martin, is noted as having 
made the remark with reference to the ever rising cost of aircraft development in his work 
“Augustine's Laws” (Arena, 1). 
Aircraft system development has been steadily increasing in cost since the 
inception of human flight.  Several factors have influenced this including economics, 
increasing complexity and increased customer expectations and requirements.  In 
addition, the contractors which produce these systems have almost consistently been 
unable to complete them within the originally contracted budget and schedule.     
Methods for reducing cost increase in system development and manufacturing 
have been studied extensively by both government and industry, but the question 
becomes whether they are targeted in the right direction. 
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Glenn Havskjold points out that an extensive list of potential methods for 
reducing cost was published in 1998 as the “Concurrent Engineering Body of 
Knowledge,” which consisted of 84 individual methods for improving cost performance.  
However, as Havskjold put it, many companies will simply chose improvement programs 
without determining whether that which is selected is, “Necessary or Sufficient to make a 
significant difference at the program level.”  In addition, he states that programs 
following this approach generally, “Fall victim to the product development law of 
unintended consequences: “That which is focused on is improved; everything else 
suffers” (Havskjold, 2).  With this in mind, Havskjold recommends that in order to 
reduce the cost increase of new systems one must first identify the cause of the problem 
and then determine the methods required to attack it. 
The factors which influence cost increase have been studied extensively by 
industry, government and private organizations and a study of those findings will be 
conducted in the following work with the intention of determining the factors which are 
primarily responsible for cost increase in aircraft acquisition programs.  Based on the 
results of the study recommendations will be made for processes which can be 
implemented to improve acquisition programs in the future. 
The discussion which follows will start by providing a brief overview of the 
Government Acquisition Process in order to define the phases and milestones during 
individual acquisition programs.  The Aircraft Design Process will be discussed in order 
to provide an overview of the phases involved in producing a new aircraft as well as to 
highlight the differences between the process for commercial and government programs.  
A study will then be conducted to evaluate the causes which drive the increasing cost of 
aircraft development programs as well as the factors which result in cost growth over 
initial program estimates.  The discussion will then move to the Nunn McCurdy process 
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which was introduced in 1982 in order to improve oversight of defense acquisition 
programs at the congressional and Department of Defense (DoD) levels.  In brief, the 
Nunn McCurdy process requires the DoD to terminate programs which exceed specific 
thresholds above original program estimates.  An evaluation will be made of available 
data on Nunn McCurdy breaches in order to determine if trends exist in the primary cases 
cited for individual breaches.  An evaluation of three recent aircraft development 
programs will then be undertaken in order to determine the primary factors which 
resulted or prevented cost increase in each case.  Following the discussion of data, 
recommendations for reducing cost will made with the goal of identifying the methods 
with which systems engineering can be used to improve the process at the system and 
program level. 
Overall, as Mark Arena put it in RAND MG-696, “The escalating cost of aircraft 
and the downward cycle of procurement rates raise issues about the number of aircraft 
[the] DoD will ultimately be able to procure and operate” (Arena, 4).  Further, the ability 
to control cost increase in these systems becomes even more relevant when one considers 




2.0 The Defense Acquisition Process  
The Defense Acquisition System is developed with the purpose of procuring the 
best solution for meeting the needs of the warfighter.  The following excerpt from the 
forward of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) summarizes the mission: 
In that context, our continued objective is to rapidly acquire quality products that 
satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability at a fair 
and reasonable price. The fundamental principles and procedures that the 
Department follows in achieving those objectives are described in DoD Directive 
5000.01 and DoD Instruction 5000.02. 
The system sets forth a framework for program development which is composed 
of milestones and checks to evaluate the readiness of a proposed system to move on to 
the next phase of development.  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, prepared by the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is a primary reference for program managers in 
major defense programs.  The DAG is a reference which outlines in detail the procedures, 
deliverables and expectations for meeting the mandatory requirements of DoD Instruction 
5000.02.  In addition the guide provides detailed discussion of background information 
and Federal Acquisition Requirements for each topic. 
As described in DoDI 5000.02, The Defense Acquisition System consists of five 
primary phases and three primary milestones.  Within the primary phases and milestones 
are several other milestones related to systems engineering, logistics, manufacturing and 
other relevant areas of system development.  Evolutionary Acquisition is a process 
defined by the DoD which Segments a Proposed Materiel Solution into a series of 
Development Programs, each of which has its own series of phases and Milestones.  As 
explained in DoDI 5000.02, the advantage of Evolutionary Acquisition lies in the ability 
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Materiel Solution and 
Analysis 
 
The purpose of this phase is to assess potential materiel solutions and to satisfy 
the phase-specific entrance criteria for the next program milestone designated by 
the Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs). 
Entrance into this phase depends upon an approved Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD) resulting from the analysis of current mission performance and 
an analysis of potential concepts across the DoD Components, international 
systems from allies, and cooperative opportunities.  The Materiel Solution 
Analysis Phase ends when the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) has been 
completed, materiel solution options for the capability need identified in the 
approved ICD have been recommended by the lead DoD Component conducting 
the AoA, and the phase-specific entrance criteria for the initial review milestone 









The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk, determine and mature the
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, and to 
demonstrate Critical Technology Elements (CTE)s on prototypes. Technology 
Development is a continuous technology discovery and development process 
reflecting close collaboration between the S&T community, the user, and the 
system developer. It is an iterative process designed to assess the viability of 










The purpose of the EMD Phase is to develop a system or an increment of 
capability; complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs 
during Technology Development); develop an affordable and executable 
manufacturing process; ensure operational supportability with particular 
attention to minimizing the logistics footprint; implement human systems 
integration (HSI); design for producibility; ensure affordability; protect CPI by 
implementing appropriate techniques such as anti-tamper; and demonstrate 
system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. The CDD, Acquisition 
Strategy, SEP, and Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) shall guide this 
effort.  Entrance into this phase depends on technology maturity (including 
software), approved requirements, and full funding. Unless some other factor is 
overriding in its impact, the maturity of the technology shall determine the path 
to be followed. EMD has two major efforts: Integrated System Design, and 
System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration. 
(con’t) 












Integrated System Design.  
This effort is intended to define system and system-of-systems functionality and 
interfaces, complete hardware and software detailed design, and 
reduce system-level risk. Integrated System Design shall include the 
establishment of the product baseline for all configuration items.  Integrated 
System Design ends with a successful Post-CDR Assessment. 
System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration.  
This effort is intended to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a 
useful way consistent with the approved KPPs and that system production can be 
supported by demonstrated manufacturing processes.  The completion of this 
phase is dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit to the program at 









The purpose of the Production and Deployment Phase is to achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Operational test and 
evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system.  
Entrance into this phase depends on the following criteria: acceptable 
performance in developmental test and evaluation and operational assessment; 
mature software capability; no significant manufacturing risks; manufacturing 
processes under control; an approved Capability Production Document (CPD); a 
refined integrated architecture; acceptable interoperability; acceptable 
operational supportability; and demonstration that the system is affordable 
throughout the life cycle, fully funded, and properly phased for rapid acquisition.
 
Phases 
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 
This effort is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development in 
order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce 
the minimum quantity necessary to provide production or production-
representative articles for IOT&E, establish an initial production base for the 
system; and permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system, 
sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion of 
operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing. 
Full Rate Production 
Continuation into full-rate production results from a successful Full-Rate 
Production (or Full Deployment) Decision Review by the MDA.  This effort 
delivers the fully funded quantity of systems and supporting materiel and 
services for the program or increment to the users. During this effort, units will 
typically attain Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  






The purpose of the Operations and Support Phase is to execute a support 
program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance 
requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its 
total life cycle. Planning for this phase shall begin prior to program initiation and 
shall be documented in the LCSP. Operations and Support has two major efforts, 
Life-Cycle Sustainment and Disposal.   
Entrance into the Operations and Support Phase depends on meeting the 
following criteria: an approved CPD; an approved LCSP; and a successful Full-
Rate Production (FRP) Decision.  
 
Phases 
LIfe Cycle Sustainment  
Life-cycle sustainment planning and execution seamlessly span a system’s entire 
life cycle, from Materiel Solution Analysis to disposal. It translates force 
provider capability and performance requirements into tailored product support 
to achieve specified and evolving life-cycle product support availability, 
reliability, and affordability parameters. 
Disposal 
At the end of its useful life, a system shall be demilitarized and disposed of 
in accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to 
safety (including 
explosives safety), security, and the environment.   
Table 2.1 Cont. – DAP Phases 
The requirements for each phase are extensive and are only be briefly described 
here.  The complete requirements for each phase of the development process can be 
found in the DAG and DoDI 5000.02 (2008).   For all new queries into documentation 
requirements at each phase the DAG should be referenced directly.  The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook is a Dynamic Document which is updated, as required for 
changes in policy.  Figure 2.3 shows a timeline of DAP Document Revisions and 
Standards Changes since 1960.  From the timeline it should be noted that the primary 
reference for the Defense Acquisition Process has changed three times since 1967 (when 
the DoDI 7000.2) was initially released with the first change (from the 7000.2 to the 
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implemented to generate a safe and airworthy aircraft.  In any aircraft development 
program the three primary drivers are weight, performance and cost.  Increased weight 
reduces performance, but decreasing weight increases cost.  Likewise, it can generally be 
argued that increasing performance can also increase weight unless cost is also increased.  
During the manufacturing phase the initial prototypes are created and the manufacturing 
processes are developed.  The development of manufacturing processes is frequently 
conducted in parallel with the design effort such that as the design for individual 
components and systems is completed the manufacturing processes are then developed. A 
more detailed diagram of the process is shown in Figure 3.2 which details a typical 
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methods for verification of the stated requirements.  The Air Vehicle specification will 
also call additional documents including Military and Industry Specifications, Standards 
and Handbooks which impose additional requirements on the operation and performance 
of the Air Vehicle and systems as well as the required methods for performance 
verification.  In “Airplane Cost Estimation: Design, Development, Manufacturing and 
Operating,” Dr. Jan Roskom details the Comparison between a Civilian and Government 
Procurement Program during the Planning and Conceptual Design Phases.  As shown in 
Figure 3.3, the primary difference from a design perspective occurs in the planning phase.  
During the planning phase the contractor (company that builds the aircraft) will iterate on 
the basic design configuration with the government customer until an initial design is 
reached.  This is generally conducted through a request for information (RFI) from the 
government procuring body to the aircraft industry.  Following the Initial Design Trades 
the Government will issue the Request for Proposal (RFP) containing the official Mission 
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Following the Initial Concept Development the Contracting Body would then 
down select to one or more designs and enter the Technology Development Phase where 
the contractor would develop and refine the design and potentially build a demonstration 
prototype.  As an example, during the Development of the Advanced Tactical Fighter 
(ATF) Aircraft two competing designs, the YF-22 and YF-23 were selected for 
prototyping or Full Scale Development (FSD) in the Technology Demonstration Phase.  
The winner of the final design evaluation, the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor was awarded 
a contract for Engineering and Manufacturing Development at Milestone B (Sometimes 
Milestone II).   On the contrary, in the LHX Program two proposals were competed at the 
concept stage but only one aircraft, the RAH-66 Comanche from Boeing/Sikorsky was 
chosen for FSD during the Technology Development Phase (Global Security). 
In Government Acquisition Programs the Design and Initial Testing of the new 
aircraft are conducted during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
Phase.  During this phase, following Milestone B approval of the Aircraft Design, the 
design organization prepares the production design and develops the manufacturing 
processes and tooling.  The initial aircraft produced are then used to complete 
qualification testing of the design.  A schedule for a representative engine development 
program moving from Technology Development to EMD is shown in Figure 3.4.  The 
government equivalent of certification, commonly referred to as qualification, is 
primarily completed during the EMD phase of the Aircraft Development Program.  
During this phase the contractor is required to simultaneously verify the manufacturing 
processes which will be employed during the production and deployment phase while 
also demonstrating through test, “That the system meets the contract specification 
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and IOT&E the Air Vehicle will be approved for Full Rate Production therefore 
completing the development cycle. 
The Aircraft Development Cycle begins with a set of mission requirements 
defined either by the prevailing market or a government customer and progresses through 
the Conceptual and Pre-Design phases to Final Design and Manufacturing Development.  
After the initial prototypes are built the design is tested and certified or qualified and then 
produced for customer use.  In military acquisition programs the Design phases are 
divided between the Materiel Solutions Analysis, Technology Development and 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Stages.  The test and certification stages of 
the development process are then completed under the umbrella of the EMD phase and 
upon completion of certification the design is given the approval for production at 
Milestone C.  Military aircraft have some additional testing requirements, referred to as 
Initial Operational Testing & Evaluation to complete in order to move on to Full Rate 
Production but overall the basic Process of Commercial and Military Aircraft Design  is 
very similar.   
In the next section an evaluation of factors contributing to the increasing cost of 
aircraft development and production will be conducted during which it will be shown that 
the primary difference between the civilian and military aircraft is the general complexity 
of the design driven by increased performance requirements. 
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4.0 Evaluating Cost Increases in Development Programs 
Cost Increases in Aircraft Development have become a very serious issue.  In, 
“Developing Innovative Products on Budget and On Schedule – Part 1 …,”Glenn 
Havskjold highlights the severity of the situation by quoting the following from the 
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense who was in the process of authorizing a study of 
acquisition process (Havskjold, 2): 
There is a growing and deep concern within the Congress and within the Department 
ofDefense (DoD) Leadership Team about the DoD acquisition processes. Many programs 
continue to increase in cost and schedule even after multiple studies and 
recommendations that span the past 15 years…By this memo, I am authorizing an 
integrated acquisition assessment… 
The committee is concerned [about] underperformance of major weapons programs… 
Problems occur because Department of Defense’s weapon programs do not capture early 
on the requisite knowledge that is needed to efficiently and effectively manage program 
risks…  
…The committee is concerned that the current Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework is not appropriately developing realistic and achievable requirements within 
integrated architectures for major weapons systems based on current technology, 
forecasted schedules and available funding… 
In addition, as part of this report industry representatives also expressed concern 
Defense contractors bear a significant share of the blame for cost overruns in major U.S. 
weapons programs, said Ronald D. Sugar, chairman and chief executive of Century City-
based Northrop Grumman Corp….”We’re a big part of the problem … The significant 
accountability on our part for overruns” traces to “a failing to do what we said we would 
do and being too optimistic going into it.” 
In summary, the available data on cost for acquisition programs indicates that the 
overall cost of aircraft development programs is rising and further, that a clear trend of 
cost overruns exists.  Several industry and private organizations including the AIAA and 
the RAND Corporation have published numerous studies outlining the overall situation 
as well as the individual causes.  The Data and Results from several of these studies have 
been reviewed and compiled with the intent of providing an overview of the work 
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conducted for comparison.  Overall, the work reviewed indicates that the primary drivers 
of cost increase in development programs result from several different factors including, 
but not limited to, the economic environment, requirements changes, technical difficulty, 
technical complexity, and estimating and planning. 
In order to discuss increasing Aircraft Cost one must first note that cost increases 
as discussed in the literature can be categorized in two different ways, cost escalation 
(program to program) and cost growth over initial estimates (individual program).  In the 
research available on the topic one can find studies that address both issues.  Cost 
Escalation in the price of aircraft, independent of that due to inflation, will overall result 
in reduced acquisition capability over time while Cost Growth in individual systems will 
ultimately further reduce the ability to acquire the desired number of aircraft or result in 
negative impacts in other areas of the budget.  In the following evaluation individual 
studies will be presented with the intent of clarifying the topics of Cost Escalation and 
Cost Growth as well as outlining the causes of each.  The topic of Cost Growth has been 
studied extensively and a significant amount of data exists on the topic.  With that in 
mind the following evaluation will segment the topics of Cost Escalation, Cost Growth, 
Escalation of Cost Growth and Causes of Cost Growth in order to preserve the 
organization and continuity of the discussion. 
 
4.1 COST ESCALATION 
Cost Escalation is the increase in cost of delivered aircraft systems of the same 
type over time or stated a different way; cost escalation is the increase in cost for new 
models of the same type of aircraft.  This can be compared to other consumer 
phenomenon such as the increasing cost of new technology items such as televisions or 
 21
cars.  Overall cost escalation is due to economic factors, like inflation, and customer 
driven factors such as new capabilities and features.    
In RAND MG-696 “Why has the Cost of Fixed-Wing Aircraft risen?” Mark 
Arena classifies the reasons for increasing cost of new programs into Economic Factors 
and Customer Driven Factors (Arena, xvii) noting that Economic Factors are associated 
with labor, materials and equipment while Customer Driven Factors include Contractual 
Issues such as quantity ordered and technical aspects such as changing requirements and 
increasing technological demand (Arena, 4).  In order to classify the primary contribution 
of each factor Mark Arena compiled a database of cost, quantity, technical and economic 
data from a variety of sources on 116 aircraft programs with the goal of quantifying cost 
growth since the 1970s.  The data was then evaluated to determine the contribution from 
both economic and Customer Driven Factors, noting that it’s been normalized both for 
inflation and changes in quantity procured.  Through this study it was found that the cost 
increase due to purely economic factors was on average 3.5% annually (Table 4.1) which, 
it is noted, is on par with the relative rate of inflation (Arena, 32).   More significantly 
though, the increased cost due to customer driven factors ranged from 2 to 12% (Arena, 
52).  The total average cost escalation for the aircraft platforms evaluated, seen in Table 
4.2, ranges from 6 to 12% annually.  Notable observations made by Arena are the Low 
Impact of Economic Factors, the positive impact of increased production and the 
correlation between platform complexity and overall cost.  To determine the effectiveness 
of the evaluation Arena evaluates a series of pair-wise comparisons for comparable 
aircraft and presents a cost escalation analysis comparing predicted values for cost 
escalation to new aircraft models to actual data for cost escalation and shows that overall 












s has been 
n complexit




 1970s.  Ov
on par with 
y have resul


















in the on C
 that the rel
r driven fac

















































wth is the 









all cost of t












 more of a
he program 
he number 



























ing the per 
cured then 














ysis of the d
 
 for a give










































ct in the ave
inflation and
al other fac
le are the pr
typing was 
d.  The resu







s.  In this 
pters and sp











e Smallest.  

















the least.  T
ocurement o










































 type of sys
he program







 at 71% w









































 4.5 – Cost G
The Cost
















.  The data
e that the co
owever fro








 on single vs
st growth c

















e likely to 
ased cost 
er hand, i
uld be low 
ams also ap
er on progr















































 of 20%.  T
 more signi











































reports for 197 programs from the period of 1960 to 1990.  The overall analysis of this 
data shows that trends exist for System Type, Program Type, and procuring body as well 
as factors such as joint acquisition and prototyping. 
 
4.3 COST GROWTH AND ESCALATION 
In 2007, Obaid Younossi and Mark Arena re-evaluate the issue of cost growth in 
RAND MG-588 “Is Weapons System Cost Growth Increasing.”  The overall intent of 
their work was to evaluate data for a smaller quantity of completed military acquisition 
programs in order to evaluate cost growth in DoD Acquisition Programs and determine if 
a trend for cost growth exists over the last three decades.  The research evaluates data for 
a set of both completed and ongoing programs.  In the first phase of the research, data is 
evaluated to determine cost growth factors for completed programs.  This data is then 
used to establish trends for cost growth and compared to the cost growth of ongoing 
programs.  In addition, a trend for cost growth in programs over the past three decades is 
evaluated by normalizing the cost growth per decade, 1970 to 1990, by the relative mix 
of program types per decade.  The following evaluation will seek to compare Younossi’s 
findings for cost growth to those of Drezner as well as to the Cost Escalation Analysis 
conducted by Mark Arena in RAND MG-696. 
In Chapter 2 of RAND MG-588 Younossi presents findings from a cost growth 
analysis of completed government acquisition programs in order to evaluate trends 
overall as well as with respect to system type.   In evaluating the overall cost growth for 
completed programs Younossi and Arena determined that the average adjusted Cost 
Growth was 46% and 65% unadjusted (Table 4.7) (Younossi-588, 16).  This represents a 
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Based on the trends derived from the analysis of completed programs Younossi 
then extends the analysis to evaluate the performance of ongoing programs with respect 
to those trends.  As an example, Figure 4.2 shows a comparison of the average cost 
growth for completed programs to the cost growth figures for ongoing aircraft programs 
based on years past Mile Stone B.  Notable data points include low risk upgrade 
programs such as the C-5 RERP and the F/A-18 E/F which are well below the line, and 
high risk unmanned and tilt-rotor programs such as the Global Hawk and V-22 Osprey 
which are well above the line.  Also noteworthy are the JSF and F/A-22 Fighter aircraft 
programs which are located right on the line.  One could infer from this distribution that 
the fighter aircraft programs are at the average level of technological risk for aircraft 
development.     
Younossi and Arena were able to show a significant trend for average cost growth 
of DoD acquisition programs however the primary goal of the research is to determine if 
the overall average cost growth of programs is increasing over time; essentially an 
escalation of cost growth.  As previously discussed, in RAND MG-696 Mark Arena 
evaluated the escalation of aircraft cost due to economic and customer driven factors and 
determined that the average cost escalation of specific platform types ranged from 7 to 
12% since the 1970s.  In RAND MG-588, Obaid Younossi and Mark Arena evaluate the 
escalation of Development Cost Growth over a three decade period spanning the 70s 
through the 90s to determine if a trend exists.  
In order to compare the data by decade Younossi and Arena normalize the cost 
growth data for each decade against a baseline according to the mix of program types.   In 
order to improve the results of the analysis the data set was increased in size and then 
divided into three subgroupings of systems with similar cost growth or characteristics.  In 
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completed and ongoing programs at MS B + 5 years.  The normalization process was 
then conducted by scaling the DCGF for each decade using a ratio of program mix from 
the reference decade (1970 or 1990). The results, detailed in Figure 4.3, show the DCGF 
for each decade at each phase of the analysis.  The most readily noticeable trend in the 
data is the apparent decrease of the raw DCGF for completed programs by decade (white 
bars).  However, after adding the data for ongoing programs and normalizing the data to 
the program mix of the 70s or 90s the overall distribution of the DCGF levels off to 
approximately 1.5 to 1.6 (striped bars).  Younossi notes that, “The apparent decline in 
cost growth [of the raw data] may be influenced by the inclusion of shorter projects and 
weapon system classes that typically experience less cost growth” (Younossi-588, 38).  In 
addition Younossi explains that the research has shown that different types of programs 
will have different quantities of cost growth and the groupings made were the best 
possible compromise between system similarity and program types during each decade.  
Other options were considered to provide groupings for this evaluation including service 
type or total cost but were not pursued.   
Overall the data, as presented indicates that there is no significant trend of 
increase or decrease in average Development Cost Growth over the three decade span 
from the 70s to the 90s.  The data when normalized by program mix shows a relatively 
consistent average over run in program budgets and from the results of this study one 
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4.4 CAUSES OF COST GROWTH 
Based on the Evaluation of Cost Growth conducted to this point it’s clear that 
trends exist for Cost Growth relative to System Type, Program Type, Service and several 
other factors.  Similar to the Cost Escalation Trends across programs, Cost Escalation 
within individual programs can likewise be attributed to several different factors.  The 
following evaluation will seek to reveal some of the factors which contribute to the cost 
growth of DoD acquisition programs some of which include system type, system 
complexity, estimating errors, planning errors, requirements changes, prototyping and 
quantity changes.   
In RAND MG-670, “Sources of Weapons System Cost Growth,” Joseph Bolten 
evaluated Contractor reported data on 35 different programs with the goal of identifying 
the underlying causes of the cost growth reported.  The data used for the analysis was 
compiled from Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) filed by the contractors and classified 
into Cost Growth Categories of Estimating and Planning Errors, Decisions, Financial and 
Miscellaneous.  In evaluating the results of the study Bolton notes that the cost allocation 
strategies utilized are not perfect and that the primary limitation in these analyses is the 
quality of the initial SAR data (Bolton, 46).  It should also be noted though, that Bolten 
does not normalize the data set for quantity changes, because the growth due to these 
changes is still realized.  The evaluation sought to determine the primary drivers of cost 
growth across the entire 35 program sample and then determine the differences, if any, 
which exist based on system type and phase of acquisition (Development and 
Procurement).  In addition, data related to specific programs is also provided for review. 
Based on the analysis the primary contributors to cost growth within programs 
can be attributed to cost estimating errors and requirements growth, which he states, 
“Account for more than half the total growth” (Bolton, 46).  Overall though, he states that 
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largest individual contributor to cost growth in many cases is decisions noting that, 
“Changes in requirements and in quantity and production schedule are the dominant 
causes of cost growth” (Bolton, 50).  The results for all 35 Programs are shown in Table 
4.10 and the results for Overall Cost Growth by System Type are shown in Table 4.11.  
From the data presented one will note that the overall cost growth reported for all 35 
programs totals 60% while the Overall Cost Growth for Aircraft and Helicopters totals 
74%.  One can also note that the bulk of this difference is the almost 19% increase in 
Errors related to cost and schedule estimates and technical issues.  In addition, from the 
Decisions category, the primary driver for Aircraft and Helicopters is Requirements and 
Schedule changes, whereas for the overall average Quantity Change is a much larger 
driver of cost growth (13% vs 22%).  From this data set one can also observe how each 
factor influences the overall cost growth of a system.  Errors in cost and schedule 
estimates and technical errors impact both the Development and Procurement Cost of a 
System while the decision to change quantity primarily affects the unit cost of a system 
and therefore, primarily impacts the procurement phase of a program.  
The Development Cost Growth Results for a subset of aircraft development 
programs are shown in Table 4.12, where it can be seen that, with the exception of the 
F18 E/F upgrade, all of the listed programs were at minimum 12% over the projected 
cost.  Another notable point here is that the cost growth over estimate does not 
discriminate between upgrades and new programs.  It can be seen that while the F18 









Table 4.11 – Overall Cost Growth Factors by
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Table 4.12 – Percent Increase in Development Cost Growth for Sample A/C Programs 
In AIAA 2009-5436 “Developing Programs on Budget and on Schedule – Part 1,” 
Glenn Havskjold evaluates the cost growth of Rocket Engine Development Programs for 
various launch vehicles.  In his evaluation Havskjold presents a cause and effect 
relationship between technical uncertainty and the quantity of rework cycles required to 
produce a product which meets customer requirements.   Havskjold then proceeds to 
evaluate four specific rocket engine development programs providing a wealth of data on 
the nature of “Development by Test” noting that within the programs discussed, 
approximately 73% of the total budget was used to eliminate failure modes while a 
meager 2% of the total budget was used for the initial design (Havskjold, 6).  He 
attributes the disproportionate amount of work required to fix problems discovered 
Percentage Growth in Development Cost
RAND MG670 ‐ Table A3 ‐ Pg 62




Estimate (mil $) 4,904.1 5,562.6 517.6 6,569.3 22,078.0 427.2 379.4
Development cost growth (mil $) 1,542.4 4,292.3 63.1 ‐118.7 10,572.4 420.7 49.7
     (%) 31.5 77.2 12.2 ‐1.8 47.9 98.5 13.1
Breakdown
Errors 17.1 30.5 9.4 ‐2.7 16.7 56.8 ‐4.0
     Cost estimate 17.0 29.0 8.5 ‐2.7 16.7 56.0 ‐4.0
     Schedule estimate 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Technical issues 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Decisions 13.4 49.1 2.8 0.0 28.9 44.1 16.8
     Requirements 17.9 16.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 48.3 19.2
     Affordability ‐9.9 4.0 0.0 0.2 ‐1.2 ‐4.2 ‐1.0
     Quantity 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 ‐6.8 0.0 0.0
     Schedule changes 0.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 ‐1.3
     Inter‐ or intraprogram transfers 5.4 16.8 0.0 ‐0.2 12.7 0.0 0.0
Financial 0.9 ‐2.5 0.0 0.9 2.3 ‐2.4 0.3
     Exchange rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Inflation 0.9 ‐2.5 0.0 0.9 2.3 ‐2.4 0.3
Miscellaneous 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Error correction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Unidentified 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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The preceding discussion has shown that Cost Escalation between programs is 
attributable to both relative economic growth as well as increased customer requirements 
for fielded systems.  The evaluation, based on the work of Mark Arena, showed that the 
increase due to economic factors including manpower, materials and equipment was 
approximately 3.5% on average which is on par with the current rate of inflation.  
Customer Driven Factors including increased capability and increased technical 
complexity were also evaluated and shown to contribute an average of 3 to 9% depending 
on the type of aircraft evaluated.   
Cost Growth in acquisition is a very large topic and as such it was divided to 
focus on the evaluations of data, the escalation of cost growth and the causes.  The 
evaluation of data, based on the work of Jeffrey Drezner showed that a significant 
amount of the Cost Growth reported in Acquisition Programs was attributable to inflation 
and Quantity Changes.  Notably the average unadjusted cost growth in the programs 
evaluated was 71% whereas the average cost growth after adjustment for inflation and 
quantity change was 20%.  In addition, the data revealed variations in cost growth for 
programs based on the system type, program type (modification vs new development), 
the procuring body (Army, Navy …), Prototyping (Yes or No) and Acquisition Strategy 
(Single or Joint Contractors).   
Cost Growth Escalation was evaluated based on the work of Obaid Younossi and 
Mark Arena.  The evaluation conducted used a data set of completed programs to 
establish a baseline for cost growth since the 1970s in order to evaluate the performance 
of ongoing programs relative to the baseline as well as to evaluate the escalation of cost 
growth over the three decade period from the 1970s to the 1990s.  The results of the 
baseline evaluation showed differences when compared to the earlier work of Drezner, 
however it’s noted that this is primarily due to the focus on completed programs which 
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have higher overall cost growth as well as the smaller sample size used by Younossi.  
The additional evaluation conducted to compare ongoing programs to the data compiled 
on completed programs showed that there is a distribution of programs both above and 
below the previously established average cost growth baseline.  Intuitively, and in line 
with the previous findings of Drezner, the data indicated that relatively high risk 
programs showed growth higher than average while low risk mod programs generally 
showed growth less than the average.  The escalation of Cost Growth was also evaluated 
to determine if an increasing or decreasing trend exists in cost growth over time.  The 
evaluation was conducted by expanding the initial data set to include relatively mature 
ongoing programs and using a normalization process to compare the average cost growth 
of the data set by decade.  Overall, the results show a decreasing trend in cost growth by 
decade for completed programs; however after including ongoing programs and 
normalizing by program mix it’s shown that the trend in average cost growth is relatively 
flat over time. 
Causes of Cost Growth were evaluated based on the work of Joseph Bolten and 
Glenn Havskjold.  Bolten’s work evaluated the SAR Reports of 35 major programs and 
classifies the reported cost growth into categories of Errors, Decisions, Financial and 
Miscellaneous.  The evaluation conducted reveals that the primary drivers of cost growth 
in the programs evaluated are due to errors in initial estimates and technical issues as well 
as requirements and quantity decisions.  Glenn Havskjold evaluates cost growth for high 
technology rocket engines based on the quantity of rework cycles required to complete 
the project with the goal of identifying a relationship between technical uncertainty and 
the quantity of rework cycles required.  Overall, he attributes the primary cause of cost 
growth in the systems evaluated to the level of technical uncertainty going into the 
program. 
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Based on the preceding evaluation one can ascertain that on average there is a 
consistent trend of cost growth in acquisition programs that results primarily from 
inadequate estimates at the contractor level and changes in system and quantity 





5.0 Nunn McCurdy 
The Nunn-McCurdy process was initiated in 1982 and requires the DoD to notify 
Congress in the event that a defense acquisition program exceeds specific thresholds with 
the purpose of improving visibility and oversight of Defense Acquisition Programs at the 
congressional and DoD levels.   
Under the current policy Nunn-McCurdy breaches are defined under categories of 
significant and critical.  Quoting the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “A 
breach of the significant cost growth threshold occurs when the program acquisition unit 
cost or the procurement unit cost increases by at least 15 percent over the current baseline 
estimate or at least 30 percent over the original baseline estimate.  A breach of the critical 
cost growth threshold occurs when the program acquisition unit cost or the procurement 
unit cost increases by at least 25 percent over the current baseline estimate or at least 50 
percent over the original baseline estimate” (GAO-295, 3) 
Recent Revisions to the Policy include the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006, which requires thresholds for Nunn-McCurdy breaches to be 
measured against the program initial baseline, and the Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 which requires the secretary of defense to terminate a program that 
experiences a critical breach unless a written certification is submitted to congress.  
Baseline estimates can still be modified under current DoD policy, however requiring 
contracts to be judged against the initial baseline prevents the DoD from avoiding a 
breach by re-baselining the program (GAO-295, 3).  Forcing the secretary of defense to 
submit a written certification for programs experiencing a critical breach imposes a 
formal review process for program justification. Quoting the GAO: 
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Programs with critical breaches must be terminated unless the Secretary of Defense 
certifies that  
 continuation of the program is essential to national security, 
 there are no alternatives to the program providing acceptable capability to meet 
the joint military requirement at less cost, the program’s  
 new estimates for program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost are 
reasonable,  
 the program is higher priority than other programs whose funding must be 
reduced to accommodate the growth in cost of the program, and  
 the program’s management structure is adequate to manage and control program 
acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost.” 
… If the program is not terminated, the Secretary of Defense must (1) restructure the 
program to address the root causes of the cost growth; (2) rescind the most recent 
milestone or key decision point approval and withdraw any associated certification; (3) 
require a new milestone or key decision point approval before taking certain contracting 
actions to ensure that the program can be restructured without unnecessarily wasting 
resources; (4) report on all funding changes made as a result of the growth in cost of the 
program, including reductions made in funding for other programs to accommodate the 
cost growth; and (5) conduct regular reviews of the program. 
 
5.1 TRENDS IN NUNN-MCCURDY BREACHES  
Several Trends have been observed in the Nunn-McCurdy process between 1997 
and 2009 as evaluated in GAO Report GAO-11-295R “Trends in Nunn-McCurdy Cost 
Breaches for Major Defense Acquisition Programs.” 
Overall, during the time period from 1997 to 2009, a total of 74 Nunn-McCurdy 
breaches were reported for 47 major defense acquisition programs.  Based on an 
evaluation of the data it was observed that by service the Air Force had the largest 
number of breaches, by Program type aircraft and helicopters had the highest quantity of 
breaches (32 Total, 64% Overall) and of the 47 programs with breaches 18 of these 
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5.2 FACTORS RESPONSIBLE  
In the data evaluated by Sullivan for breaches occurring between 1997 and 2009  
it was determined that Nunn-McCurdy Breaches occur as a result of a variety of factors.    
Those factors cited as being the most prevalent are Engineering and Design Issues, 
Schedule Issues and Quantity Changes.  Other issues Cited include Revised Estimates, 
Economic Changes, Requirements Changes, Support Costs, Funding Issues and 
Production Issues (Figure 5.3). 
Aside from Quantity changes which are outside of the control of the contractor, 
the four primary causes reported are Engineering and Design issues, schedule issues and 
revised estimates; all of these factors could be interpreted as inadequate systems 
definition at program inception.  In the evaluation the GAO points out that breaches 
attributed to Engineering and Design issues could result from, “programs started without 
adequate knowledge about their requirements and the resources needed to fulfill them” 
(GAO-295, 11).  Further, breaches due to Revised Estimates infers that the, “[Original] 
estimates were based on inaccurate assumptions” (GAO-295, 11).  Similar conclusions 
can be drawn for breaches resulting from schedule issues.   Overall the GAO points out 
that the cost estimated for most defense procurement programs are based on limited 
knowledge and over-optimistic assumptions.  In referencing a 2008 GAO report on the 
topic of program estimates it’s stated that, ”development costs for major acquisition 
programs are often underestimated at program initiation—by 30 to 40 percent in some 
cases—in large part because the estimates are based on limited knowledge and optimistic 
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5.3 FUTURE POLICY  
Going forward the DoD is instituting processes to provide early warning that 
programs are in trouble and is refining the policy to limit the number of breaches caused 
by quantity change.  The GAO states that: 
DOD has instituted a process to provide earlier warning of potential breaches and plans to 
propose changes to try to limit the effect of breaches caused by quantity changes. 
Specifically, the Joint Staff has implemented a Nunn-McCurdy trip wire process to 
evaluate the factors that are contributing to cost growth so that programs can take 
mitigating actions. Our analysis shows nearly 40 percent of Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
occurred after a production decision had been made—when a program has fewer options 
for restructuring. DOD also plans to propose a legislative amendment to reduce several 
statutory requirements added in 2009 for Nunn-McCurdy breaches when it determines 
the breach was caused primarily by quantity changes that were unrelated to poor 
performance. Tracking changes in research and development costs, which are not 
sensitive to quantity changes, would be one way DOD could evaluate program 
performance in this context. 
The Nunn-McCurdy process was initiated in 1982 with the purpose of improving 
visibility and oversight of Defense Acquisition Programs at the congressional and DoD 
levels.   In data evaluated between 1997 and 2009 74 total breaches were reported for 47 
programs with 18 programs reporting more than one.  An evaluation of the reported 
breaches revealed trends by service, program type and by cause reported.  Based on the 
available data the Air Force had the largest quantity of breaches, 64% of all breaches 
were for aircraft programs and engineering and design issues are the primary cause 
reported for breaches.  In addition, it was found that the data generally agrees with 
previous evaluations on cost increase.   Further, changes are being implemented to refine 
the process and improve oversight. 
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6.0 Case Studies from Recent Development Programs 
In the discussion which follows, case studies from several recent aircraft 
development programs will be evaluated to determine the factors which influenced the 
relative success or failure of each.  A comparative study between the F/A-18 E/F and 
F/A-22 Fighter aircraft platforms will be evaluated to highlight the significant contrast in 
cost growth in these two programs and the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Program will 
be evaluated to highlight the danger in assuming that the low risk inherent to 
modification programs precludes any potential for significant cost growth. 
 
6.1 F-22 RAPTOR VS F-18 E/F SUPER HORNET 
The Lockheed Martin F-22 is a revolutionary fighter aircraft designed from the 
outset to replace the McDonald Douglass F-15 in the air superiority role (Younossi-276, 
2) while in contrast, the McDonald Douglass (now Boeing) F-18 E/F was developed to 
increase the capability and survivability of the current F-18 C/D (Younossi-276, 3).  As 
noted in the previous evaluations of Cost Growth upgrade or modification programs 
typically exhibit lower cost growth than new development however the F-18 E/F and F-
22 represent two very significant data points in the development history of fighter 
aircraft.  As noted in Figure 6.1, the cost growth for the F-18 E/F is well below the 
average cost growth for the fighter aircraft evaluated while, with the exception of the F-
14, the F-22 is well above the average.  The F/A-18E/F and F/A-22 fighter aircraft 
programs initiated the EMD phase of development almost simultaneously at the 
beginning of the 1990s however while the F-18 completed both on Cost and on schedule 
the F-22 continues to incur schedule slips and cost growth.  The following evaluation will 
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decided to require development of the first fully integrated fighter avionics system, and 
incorporate revolutionary new technologies into the fire control radar based on a solid-
state active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology (Younossi-276, 16) 
The F-18 E/F upgrade required extensive airframe modifications and new engines 
however the avionics would be integrated from the C/D model and the new engines 
would be derivatives based on existing architecture from the F-18 C/D (Younossi-276, 
23).  Both programs pursued risk mitigation prior to development however the overall 
results were different.  In preparation for the Advanced Technology Fighter (ATF) 
Program, the concept which became the F-22, the Air Force implemented several risk 
mitigation development programs to prepare the technology required for the stealth 
requirements, improved radar, integrated avionics, improved engines and short takeoff 
and landing (STOL) capability however all of the technology would still need to be 
integrated into the final product (Younossi-276, 16).  In addition, the airframe for the F-
22 was developed as the YF-22 and competed in a fly off against the Northrop YF-23 to 
win the ATF contract.  Significant risk mitigation also took place in generating the 
requirements for the F-18 E/F.  In addressing options to meet the requirements the Navy 
considered several options in addition to the upgraded F-18 including an upgraded F-14 
and a Naval Version of the ATF, however  according to Younossi, following the 
cancellation of the A-12 in 1991, “The Navy preferred to pursue the lower-cost, lower-
risk multimission design approach based on the Hornet 2000 studies” (Younossi-276, 
22).  Following the decision to pursue the improved hornet the Navy further directed 
McDonald Douglass to pursue additional risk mitigation strategies (Younossi-276, 21).  
In addition, it should also be noted that although the F-18 intended to use the avionics 
from the C/D model for the initial development several stages of avionics upgrades were 
planned in the format of an evolutionary acquisition strategy thereby eliminating the risk 
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implemented for new programs by the DoD in the early 1990s.  Integrated product teams 
are part of a Matrix Organizational approach to development which integrates product 
and functional groups.  Individual IPTs are composed of a team of individuals 
representing various engineering and management functions on both the government and 
industry side (Younossi-276, 17, 26).  The F-22 was required to implement the IPT 
structure during the Dem/Val (now called Technology Development) stage of the 
program whereas the F-18 instituted the new structure at the inception of EMD.  It’s 
noted by Younossi that the implementation of the IPT framework during the ATD 
program resulted in an almost 2 year delay of the initial fly off while in contrast he also 
states that, “Many observers believe effective use of the IPT approach was one of the 
most important management initiatives promoting stability and effective management of 
technological challenges in the F/A-18E/F effort” (Younossi-276, 17, 26).  Both 
programs also implemented the EVMS process for budget and schedule tracking, but 
there are clear differences between the budgeting methods employed in each program.  
EVMS is a tool used by contractors and the government to track cost and schedule 
performance actuals against the planned baseline.  In tracking project performance the 
contractor reports hours used or and work completed to calculate the Actual Cost of 
Work Performed (ACWP) and Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) for 
comparison against the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS).  Accurate tracking 
of EVM data allows the contractor and government to maintain up to date status of the 
progress of a given program (Younossi-276, 47).  According to the research conducted by 
Younossi the F-22 Program only budgeted 2% for management reserve (MR) while the 
program managers on the F-18 budgeted 10% for MR.  Management reserve is cost 
factored into the initial estimate in order to address problems in the program as they arise; 
it’s essentially a way to account for unknowns (Younossi-276, 50).  As a result of 
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effective planning the MR for the F-18 E/F program lasted all the way through the 
program whereas the MR for the F-22 was entirely consumed within two calendar years.  
The F-18 E/F and F-22 programs both employed new strategies for program and financial 
management however, based on an evaluation of the implementation of these strategies 
on each program one can argue that effective implementation of both acquisition 
strategies significantly contributed to the cost and schedule performance of the F-18 E/F. 
The third and potentially most significant factor which affected the success of the 
F-18 and F-22 programs is the Work Split & Industrial Base employed by each program.  
Per Younossi, the F-22 program implemented an even work split over three contractors in 
order to preserve the capabilities of each to continue on as prime contractors in the 
defense industry.  Therefore, although Lockheed Martin functioned as the Prime 
Contractor for the F-22 program the work split divided major systems of the aircraft over 
three contractors.  Younossi argues that the artificial work split for the program resulted 
in cost over runs and schedule delays because the contractors involved had never 
formally worked with each other in the past.  In addition, the YF-22 technology 
demonstrator was developed by the Lockheed Martin Skunkworks in Burbank California 
a team known for its ability to execute on aircraft development programs including the U-
2 and SR-71 spy planes and the F-117 A stealth attack aircraft.  At the inception of the 
EMD contract the development and production of the F-22 was moved to the Lockheed 
Martin facility in Marietta Georgia.  Younossi explains that the Marietta facility produced 
cargo aircraft and was not equipped with engineers who had the expertise required to 
develop a high performance stealth aircraft.  In addition, he notes that less than 10% of 
the original development team moved to Marietta with the program.  He states that  
[Although] Lockheed and the U.S. government publicized the move as a cost-cutting 
measure ... This inability to attract engineers and managers who gained specialized 
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experience during the early phase of development from Burbank to Marietta along with 
Marietta’s lack of a design team capable of meeting the F/A-22’s engineering challenges 
arguably may have been the root of many problems during development (Younossi-276, 
19-20). 
In contrast the F-18 E/F program benefitted from an established work split from 
the C/D model as well as an established supplier base and production facility.  Younossi 
notes that both McDonald and Northrop, “Had experienced design teams in place and 
drew heavily from [an] existing supplier and industrial base” (Younossi-276, 24).  The 
advantage provided by existing business relationships and experienced teams on the F-18 
is another factor which contributed significantly to the success of the program, and 
ultimately the opposite lead to cost increase on the F-22.  
The preceding evaluation, based on the work of Obaid Younossi, explored several 
factors which influenced the success of the F-18 E/F program and the cost growth of the 
F-22.  The factors evaluated include Technological Risk, Program & Financial 
Management Strategy and Work Split & Industrial Base.  The F-18 E/F program 
benefited from low technological risk and evolutionary acquisition strategy, effective 
implementation of the IPT Program structure, EVMS tracking tools, program budget and 
established business relationships and engineering teams.  In contrast the F-22 program 
suffered cost growth resulting from a high risk development strategy combined with 
difficult implementation of the IPT Structure and Inadequate initial Estimates of 
Management Reserve as well as an un-established work split and industrial base.   
 
6.2 VH-71 PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER 
In the previous case it was determined that a strategy focused on the upgrade of 
an existing platform could be significantly successful given the right mix of program 
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management and risk mitigation.  The following case will evaluate another upgrade 
program which had significant importance to the DoD.   
The VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Program, initially designated VXX was 
initiated following a re-evaluation of Presidential Transportation Requirements following 
the September 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks on the United States (GAO-380, 2).  The 
program sought to procure a fleet of 23 helicopters to replace the aging fleet of Sikorsky 
VH-3D and VH-60N Helicopters currently used by the president and other VIPs for 
transportation in the United States and around the world (Global Security).  The contract, 
awarded in 2005 to a Lockheed Martin led team consisting of Augusta Westland and Bell 
Helicopter Textron, would modify the Augusta Westland Designed EH-101 Helicopter to 
meet the requirements for the VXX mission.  The aircraft, Designated VH-71 and Marine 
One when the president is on board, would be delivered in two increments in order to 
provide Initial Operating Capability (IOC) as soon as 2008.  Increment one would 
provide 5 total aircraft in order to develop IOC capability while increment 2 would be 
developed to meet all of the VXX mission requirements (Global Security).  The initial 
contract award was valued at $1.7 bil for system development and demonstration but the 
overall contract was valued at $6.1 bil for all helicopters, test and development efforts. In 
June of 2009, however, the program was cancelled (from the GAO)  
… following the expenditure of close to $3 billion and a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach 
of the cost growth threshold, the Department of Defense (DOD) terminated the Navy’s 
VH-71 presidential helicopter acquisition program and contract because of cost growth, 
schedule delays, and projected system performance (GAO-380, 1) 
The following evaluation will seek to determine the causes which led to the cancellation 
of the VH-71 program with the goal of determining what lessons can be employed in 
future acquisition strategy. 
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In a Jan 1, 2005 Article from Aviation Week, Michael Bruno quoted John J. 
Young Jr., the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development & Acquisition 
as saying 
This decision truly reflects the best value and capability for the American taxpayer who is 
funding it, the Marines who will operate it, and the future presidents who will fly in it 
The question then becomes, what went wrong?  In a 2011 study conducted by the GAO 
to evaluate the lessons learned from the VH-71 program it’s reported that the overall 
reasons for cost escalation and subsequent program cancellation can be attributed to three 
primary causes: High Risk Initial Business Case, Lack of Proper System Definition and 
Inability to Make Trade-Offs required to meet the Program Budget.  Fundamentally, 
though, all of the reasons cited by the GAO can be classified under the broad heading of 
Inadequate Planning and Estimating. 
The GAO states that the VH-71 program had a High Risk initial Business Case 
because the program employed a two-phase acquisition process simultaneously initiating 
production and development efforts under a compressed schedule (GAO 380, 5).  
Jeremiah Gertler of the Congressional Research Service explains that the program was 
divided into two phases in order to provide a limited capability initial aircraft for short-
term transitional use and a final increment two aircraft meeting all of the mission 
requirements.  He notes that the most significant differences between the increment I and 
increment II aircraft are the addition of a new engine, transmission, and main rotor blade 
configuration (Gertler, 4, 7).  Gertler further states (quoting the GAO) 
The VH-71 program began with a compressed schedule dictated by White House needs 
stemming from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. According to the program 
manager, this aggressive acquisition strategy included a source selection process that was 
shorter than desired and contributed to confusion regarding specifications between the 
program office and the contractor and concurrent design, testing, and production that 
resulted in increased program risk, an unsustainable schedule, and inaccurate cost 
estimates (Gertler, 8). 
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Overall it can be observed that in procuring the VH-71 aircraft, significant risk was 
assumed by the government in order to field a new system as quickly as possible.  
Lack of proper systems definition is another fallout from the high risk initial 
development schedule.  Per the GAO, the VH-71 program initiated key phases of the 
systems engineering review process well after the normally acceptable stages which 
resulted in disagreement over design requirements and a lack of design stability as the 
program progressed.  It’s stated 
Had the VH-71 program followed acquisition best practices and conducted early systems 
engineering, it could have led to a feasible, stable preliminary design ideally before 
development start. In turn, a stable, early design allows for more accurate program cost 
estimates and a better foundation for sufficient funding commitments. Instead, it began 
without completing systems engineering until well after development start. As a 
consequence, it never achieved design stability and experienced significant cost and 
schedule problems in development (GAO-380, 4) 
The VH-71 Program System Requirements Review (SRR) should have occurred prior to 
development start however it was not initiated until 4 months following the initiation of 
the development stage (GAO 380, 6).  Further, the program Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) for both increment 1 and 2 were conducted 
behind schedule.  The GAO points out that the PDR for increment I, which should have 
been completed prior to the start of development, occurred 13 months after the start of 
development.  Further, “A PDR for Increment 2 had not occurred by the time a stop work 
order was placed on the Increment 2 effort in December 2007—35 months after the start 
of Increment 2 development “(GAO 380, 6).  In brief, the VH-71 experienced significant 
problems as direct fallout from a failure to properly execute the systems engineering 
processes required to ensure that the program was moving forward with a stable 
configuration and goal.  The systems engineering process is a tool for ensuring that 
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proper planning is executed in a timely manner and the failure of the program to properly 
implement these process is a clear indication of inadequate planning. 
In evaluating the causes of failure in the VH-71 program the third cause noted by 
the GAO is the inability to make trades in the design to in order to meet the programs 
financial and schedule goals.  He clarifies that the inability to make trade-offs was a 
result of the stringent requirements of the program and states 
Stringent performance requirements (some with no flexibility) were laid out for the 
system prior to the start of development and did not appear to involve significant 
consideration of trade-offs of cost, performance, and schedule negotiated between the 
customer and the developer (GAO 380, 7) 
In evaluating these statements one can infer that the fundamental issue again falls back to 
inadequate planning.  If the program had been properly planned from the outset and the 
necessary requirements reviews conducted the program managers on both sides would 
have been aware of the conflict which existed between the overall requirements and 
desired program cost and schedule. 
The VH-71 program was initiated following a re-evaluation of Presidential 
Transportation Requirements following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks on the 
United States.  From the outset the program was intended to be a low-risk modification or 
upgrade program and at the time of award Lockheed Martin Systems Integration claimed 
that the, “Program would integrate a "system of systems" with a modern, in-production 
aircraft to provide the president with safe and reliable helicopter transportation” (Global 
Security VH-71).  However, the failure to properly plan and estimate the effort in 
conjunction with an accelerated schedule and hard requirements which did not allow for 
trade-offs to be made between program goals and cost resulted in significant cost growth 
and schedule delay.  At the time of cancellation in 2009, the program was estimated to 
double in cost from the initial estimate and be delayed by 6 years.  The GAO states that, 
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“The VH-71 program’s failure to follow acquisition best practices was a critical factor in 
the program’s poor performance that led to its ultimate termination,” (GAO 380, 8) and 
recommends that future programs learn from these mistakes.  
 
In the preceding evaluation of defense acquisition programs it was shown that the 
F-18 E/F program was incredibly successful because the program was based on a low risk 
technical strategy and benefited from successful implementation of IPT Program 
structure and EVMS tracking tools as well as established business relationships and 
engineering teams.  In contrast the F-22 and VH-71 programs both suffered from high 
cost growth although each program used a different acquisition strategy.  The F-22 was a 
revolutionary clean sheet design implementing the most advanced technologies in the 
airframe, avionics and engines while the VH-71 was intended to be an upgrade to an 
existing platform similar to the F-18 E/F.  Although there are some differences between 
the reasons for cost growth in the F-22 and VH-71 programs one will note that both 
ultimately suffered from inadequate initial estimates and program planning.  The F-22 
program suffered from inadequate planning of the development budget and work split 
and the VH-71 program suffered from inadequate planning of program requirements.  It 
could be argued that both of these programs if planned more effectively had the potential 





7.0 Cost Reduction Recommendations 
From the previous evaluation of factors affecting Cost Increase in acquisition 
programs as well as the case studies from individual programs one can discern that some 
costs such as those related to producing the actual aircraft must increase as a natural 
reflection of the economy and growing customer needs while others such as those 
resulting from poor estimates and changing requirements could be decreased by applying 
risk mitigation factors up front.  As with factors which increase cost, many methods for 
reducing cost in aircraft programs have also been studied and research in this area has 
provided many different avenues for evaluation.  As noted by Havskjold, the “Concurrent 
Engineering Body of Knowledge” defines 84 individual areas under “5 Pillars” (Strategy, 
People, Process, Tools and Technology) (Havskjold, 2) which have been identified as 
potential avenues for cost reduction in development programs.  From the previous 
evaluation of cost growth, Nunn McCurdy breaches and the case studies on individual 
aircraft programs several causes for cost increase in aircraft programs have been 
identified.  On the DoD side the primary causes for cost increase stem from requirements 
and quantity changes.  On the contractor side the primary causes identified are errors in 
evaluating program requirements, errors in estimating the initial program schedule and 
cost, errors in estimating the technical complexity of the program and inadequate 
program management.  The following evaluation will explain the factors which are 
outside of the control of the contractor and focus on implementing a framework for 
system development through systems engineering which can be used to address the 




7.1 QUANTITY AND REQUIREMENTS CHANGES 
The current financial climate is not ideal, as noted by Elizabeth Ferrell in the 
Bureau of National Affairs Federal Contract Report: 
The current FY2011 budget and funding crisis has created serious short- and long-range 
implications for companies performing contracts for the United States. Our federal 
government has performed under stop-gap appropriations resolutions for over half of the 
fiscal year, at flat spending levels that are insufficient to fully perform many ongoing 
contracts. Moreover, the proposed budgets for the remainder of FY2011 and beyond 
reflect significant cuts in funding available for procurement. As a result, the government 
will be forced to take steps to reduce procurement spending by changing, restructuring, or 
abandoning programs and contracts.  Contractors can expect partial or total terminations, 
de-scoping of quantities and capabilities, contract stretch-outs, breaks in production, and 
other efforts by the government to alter contracts and programs to align government 
spending with available funds (Ferrell, 1).  
The DoD must constantly align its budget with available funding which fluctuates in 
response to an ever changing political and economic environment.  In addition, the DoD 
must balance that budget over a number of strategic priorities.  In order to manage the 
conflict between available budget and priorities the DoD and procuring agency will 
institute quantity and requirements changes in acquisition programs which commonly 
result in cost growth. 
According to the March, 2011 GAO Assessment on Selected Weapons programs, 
the DoD is currently running 98 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that are 
publicly reported (GAO-233, 4).  In light of this the DoD will make changes to specific 
programs by adjusting Quantity and Schedule in order to address budgetary concerns.  
For example, the production run for the previously discussed F/A-22 Raptor was reduced 
from an initially proposed quantity of 648 aircraft to 188 total aircraft in order to reduce 
the overall program cost to meet the initial estimates.  Under the original budget the 
program was projected to cost $80 bil ($22 bil for Development and $58 bil for 
production) (Arena 63, 67).  Following readjustment the final program cost is $77.4 bil 
($39.2 bil for Development and $37.6 bil for production) with a unit cost change from 
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$139 mil to $412 mil per copy (GAO-233 140).  This change ultimately allowed the 
program to stay within budget, however at a significant increase in unit cost.  In another 
example, the entire mission of the C-17 changed reducing the proposed quantity required 
from 210 to 40 (GAO-26).  Although, ultimately 120 C-17 Aircraft were procured, the 
reduction in quantity ultimately increased the unit cost.  Overall, the DoD will adjust 
quantity in order to maintain a balance between operational requirements and available 
budget. 
Requirements changes instituted by the procuring body are, generally, outside of 
the control of the contractor.  There are numerous examples of requirements changes or 
“requirements creep” in aircraft development programs.  For example, the Global Hawk 
UAV program developed a second aircraft to meet revised sensor payload requirements 
(GAO-222) and in order to further justify the F-22, the Air Force added the attack role to 
the F-22 making it the F/A-22 in order to align the program with perceived mission 
requirements following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Younossi-588, 2).  Each of 
these changes in program requirements significantly affect the overall cost of the program 
in some way which can result in adverse cost performance outside of the direct control of 
the contractor. 
Ferrell points out that the DoD budget is continuing to experience reductions in 
order to meet goals in other areas of the government.   She notes that for 2011 the DoD 
has only received $513 bil of the $549 bil requested to fund programs and that further 
budget cuts are expected in order to achieve “President Obama’s goal of achieving $400 
billion in defense spending savings by 2023” (Ferrell 2).  She states 
Given the budget crisis for FY2011 and the foreseeable future, agencies simply will have 
insufficient funds with which to execute existing and planned programs.  Agencies will 
be forced to take drastic action to align procurement expenditures with available funding. 
Historically, agencies have employed a variety of measures to cope with inadequate 
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funding, including reducing capabilities or quantities (de-scoping), extending 
performance schedules to match funding levels, terminating contracts, other contract or 
program restructuring, or taking alternative action to move or defer procurement costs to 
the future (Ferrell, 2). 
From this, one can ascertain that the DoD must prioritize its acquisition programs in 
order to achieve the desired capability for the warfighter while maintaining a portfolio 
that is within the allotted budget.  In order to do this the DoD will be required to cut back 
on non-critical programs and redefine quantity, schedule and possibly requirements of 
remaining programs as required and allowed by the contracting process.  In light of this 
adverse climate contractors must take every possible action to ensure that program goals 
are met within the allotted budget and schedule. 
 
7.2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Systems Engineering is a discipline developed by both industry and the 
government for the purpose of managing the system development process.  The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook states that 
Balanced system solutions are best achieved by applying established systems engineering 
processes to the planning, development, and sustainment of a system or a system-of-
systems (SoS) acquisition in an Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
framework … Systems engineering offers a technical framework to enable sound 
decision making relative to trade studies, system performance, risk, cost, and schedule. 
The successful instantiation of proven, disciplined systems engineering processes results 
in a total system solution that is adaptive to changing technical, production, and operating 
environments and to the needs of the use and is balanced among the multiple 
requirements, design considerations, design constraints, and program budgets (DAG 
4.1.1).   
Put more simply, Systems Engineering is a process for planning programs and 
ensuring that requirements are met by implementing a process for tracking and executing 
on their implementation.  On a Major Defense Acquisition Program Systems Engineering 
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Overall, the Systems Engineering framework is more than just requirements 
definition and management; proper implementation of systems engineering principles 
allows an engineering organization to evaluate technical risk, improve the estimating 
process, define and evaluate options for system development, perform trade studies and 
evaluate alternatives, and effectively structure and manage a development program.  In 
addition there are defined procedures for developing the required specifications which 
document system, component, process and material performance and verification 
requirements.  The systems engineering process also defines a clear procedure for 
executing technical reviews and meetings required during each phase of the program 
(DAU SEG 74).  A diagram outlining the specification levels required is shown in Figure 
7.2. 
The Systems Engineering Process provides many valuable tools for improving 
program performance.  The goal of the following evaluation will be to show how aspects 
of Systems Engineering can be incorporated into the development program to counteract 





































































































which implements an Organizational Breakdown Structure (OBS) composed of 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to maximize the efficiency of design, manufacturing 
and supportability tasks (DAG 4.1.5).  Systems Engineering is an IPT within the overall 
IPPD framework shown notionally in Figure 7.3.  Systems Engineering is responsible for 
generating the program level Integrated Master Plan (IMP) and Integrated Master 
Schedule (IMS) as well as the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).  These three 
documents define the overall program milestones, program timeline and the individual 
work elements to be performed in executing the development program (Mitre).  The 
Program level IMS and WBS also provide a baseline which is used to track program 
performance using the Earned Value Management System (EVMS).  From the DAG 
Performance measurement of WBS elements, using objective measures, is essential for 
Earned Value Management and Technical Assessment activities to determine program 
progress. These objective measures are used to report progress in achieving milestones 
and should be integrated with Technical Performance Measures and Critical Technical 
Parameters (DAG 4.5.4.2).  
As discussed earlier, EVMS is a tool for managing program performance by tracking 
work completed and cost actuals against an established program baseline.  In tracking 
project performance the contractor reports hours used or and work completed to calculate 
the Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) and Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
(BCWP) for comparison against the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS).  When 
planning the initial schedule and budget a management reserve (MR) will be applied on 
top of the estimated budget at completion (BAC) to arrive at the total acquisition budget 
(TAB).  A diagram illustrating the terminology and tracking methods used in EVMS can 
be seen in Figure 7.4. 
Management Reserve is budget added to the program baseline estimate which has 
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the contractor to properly interpret and implement the program requirements was one 
factor which ultimately led to program cost growth and termination.  The GAO 
recommendation going forward is to employ a Knowledge Based Acquisition strategy 
which requires specific systems engineering inputs at specific milestones in program 
development.  The process, shown in Figure 7.5, contains 3 knowledge points 
implemented to ensure that a high level of program knowledge is available before 
commitments are made to move forward (GAO-233, 16).  Knowledge point 1 occurs at 
MS B in the DAP and requires that, “Technology, time, funding and other resources 
match customer needs.”  At this point the PDR should be completed, all technologies 
should be demonstrated, Incremental Acquisition strategies are defined and a knowledge-
based cost estimate has been defined.  If all of the required conditions are met at this 
point then the, “Decision to invest in product development,” will be made.  Knowledge 
point 2 occurs at a point between MS B and MS C and requires that the, “Design is stable 
and performs as expected.”  At this point the program, “CDR and all subsystem design 
reviews [are] completed,” 90% of all engineering is completed and, “an integrated system 
prototype [has been] demonstrated.”  Completion of this Knowledge Point precludes the 
decision to initiate build and verification testing of the, “production representative 
prototypes.”  Knowledge point 3 occurs at MS C and requires that the “Production [will] 
meet cost, schedule and quality targets.”  At this phase the, “Production representative 
prototype,” has been evaluated in the mission environment, all manufacturing processes 
are ready, and “product reliability [has been] demonstrated [in] a production 
representative prototype.”  At the completion of this Knowledge Point the decision to 
produce initial customer units (LRIP) is then made (GAO-380, 9).  The Knowledge 
Based Acquisition process is an extension of the Defense Acquisition Process which 
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for integrating technical uncertainty.  The Cask corporation points out that, “[The] DoD 
has been migrating away from a platform-centric approach in delivering capability to one 
of integrating hardware and software in the form of a System of Systems (SoS) to meet 
the unique requirements of end users” (Cask).  In order to facilitate this, the Cask 
Corporation proposes that the ideal estimating team is comprised of Systems Engineers 
who will break down the system into constituent components and Cost Estimators who 
can generate the necessary cost analysis for the proposed system.  This view is furthered 
by the Mitre Corporation in their Systems Engineering Guide which provides a high level 
view of the integration between Systems Engineering and the Cost Estimating Process.  
According to Mitre, “Systems engineers (SEs) are expected to use cost analysis to 
identify and quantify risks, and to evaluate competing systems/initiatives, proposals, and 
trade-offs ... SEs support and provide direction to the analyst, review results, guide and 
evaluate the sensitivity of the analysis, and provide technical, programmatic, and 
enterprise-wide perspectives and context for the analyst” (Mitre).  The Mitre Corporation 
further provides a framework for implementation of the Cost Estimation Process in 
Conjunction with the Systems Engineering Process.  The phases, Figure 7.6, involve 
defining the scope and assumptions of the estimate and linking the estimate to the project 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).  In addition, by integrating Systems Engineering and 
the Project Estimate the Systems Engineer is able to more easily conduct trade studies 
and Analysis of Alternatives in support of the overall project definition. This is very 
valuable because, it will be noted that the ability to conduct trade-offs between cost and 
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structure.  Mitre points out that, “[Assessing Integration Risk] is an integral part of the 
systems engineering job and critical to the success of the technology transition” (Mitre).  
The Mitre Systems Engineering Guide further clarifies that an assessment of TRL is 
required in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for all DoD programs, and that 
technologies with a TRL of less than 6 can increase the difficulty of program approval.  
Other methods for incorporating technical uncertainty in estimating have been 
researched with the intent of drawing parallels to the techniques outlined in the systems 
engineering process.  In “Developing Innovative Products on Budget and On Schedule -- 
Part 1,” Glenn Havskjold Discusses Methods for utilizing previous development data to 
determine a correlation between technical uncertainty and development cost and John 
Reynolds of NASA has developed the Performance Based Estimating Tool with the 
intent of incorporating factors for technical uncertainty and team performance into the 
estimating process. 
In the evaluation of causes of cost growth the work conducted on rocket engine 
development programs by Glenn Havskjold highlighted the link between technical 
uncertainty and the quantity of rework cycles required to complete the development of a 
high technology product.  This parallels the findings from the evaluation of cost growth 
data conducted by Drezner and Younossi where one could ascertain that the disparity in 
cost growth between system types may infer that there are varying levels of technical 
uncertainty associated with different types of acquisition programs and systems.  From 
the data, electronic systems were shown to exhibit lower cost growth while aircraft, 
missiles, helicopters and space systems exhibited increasingly larger values of average 
cost growth (Table 7.1).  Further, the evaluations tended to show that modification 
programs based on established technology exhibit lower cost growth than new designs. 
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Table 7.1 – Cost Growth Factor Data Comparison 
In the research pursued by Havskjold a correlation was shown between the 
quantity of rework cycles required and the technical uncertainty evaluated in the overall 
product as well as the subcomponents of specific rocket engine programs.  Havskjold’s 
work focuses on determining the cost of development based on the existing product 
development cycle in a given company with the intent of creating a tool to accurately 
predict the cost of new product development.  He states that once an organization can 
ascertain within reasonable error the actual development cost of a new product then it 
will be possible to explore other methods for reducing the cost of rework cycles or 
reducing the level of technical uncertainty and therefore the overall quantity of rework 
cycles.  In his work he further evolves this by showing a correlation between technical 
uncertainty and overall program cost.  He then uses the data compiled to successfully 
predict the development cost of a new rocket engine (the RS-68).  The most significant 
System Type Cost Growth Data
Drezner Younossi
CGF n CGF n
Aircraft 1.28 14 1.35 9
Helicopter 1.13 5 1.76 3
Missile 1.17 44 1.52 8
Cruise Missile ‐ ‐ 1.64 4
Electronic 1.24 27 1.23 12
Electronic Aircraft ‐ ‐ 1.52 5
Munition 1.22 7 ‐ ‐
Vehicle 1.71 3 1.67 1
Space 1.16 3 ‐ ‐
Launch Vehicles ‐ ‐ 2.30 1
Satellites ‐ ‐ 1.55 2
Ship 1.10 14 ‐ ‐
Other 0.99 3 1.40 1
Source RAND MR‐291 RAND MG‐588
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aspects of this research are the identification of a procedure for evaluating the technical 
uncertainty of proposed development and an identification of the threshold for unknown 
unknowns, essentially unknowns that will not be discovered until testing is initiated. 
As discussed above, the National Air and Space Administration (NASA) has also 
done extensive research on cost estimating.  Evolving on the previously discussed TRL 
scales, John Reynolds of NASA in collaboration with Boeing Developed the Performance 
Based Estimating Tool (P-BEAT) in order to incorporate additional complexity factors 
directly into the estimating environment.  P-BEAT utilizes a standard database of actuals 
to derive Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) based on component mass and part count 
as well as the required materials and manufacturing processes, but also incorporates 
additional data for Product Life Cycle, Design Team Capability and Technology 
Readiness Level (Figure 7.8).  The addition of the complexity factors allows the tool to 
incorporate complexity metrics which show the projected impact on the overall 
development cost (Figure 7.9).  P-BEAT allows estimators to evaluate the cost required 
to improve the technology readiness level of a program as well as the impact of 
technology readiness level on the overall cost.  Overall, the combination of Complexity 
and Parametric estimating factors allows the estimator to obtain greater estimate accuracy 
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From the previous evaluation of cost in acquisition programs Inadequate estimates 
of cost, schedule and technical uncertainty were identified as significant recurring drivers 
of cost growth which a contractor can control.  This evaluation has sought to propose 
methods which contractors can implement to improve estimates by integrating systems 
engineering and cost estimating processes as well as implementing advanced cost 
estimating techniques which account for technical uncertainty and design team 
experience.  In addition, these changes will provide the capability for enhanced 
evaluation of requirements and cost trade-offs. 
Systems Engineering is a discipline developed by both industry and the 
government which has been developed for the purpose of managing the system 
development process and it provides a toolset for contractors to use for increasing 
program efficiency.  Implementation of systems engineering principles allows an 
engineering organization to manage requirements, evaluate technical risk, improve the 
estimating process, define and evaluate options for system development, perform trade 
studies and evaluate alternatives, and effectively structure and manage a development 
program. 
In 2003 The INCOSE Systems Engineering Center of Excellence conducted a 
study on the value of systems engineering.  In the study, Eric Honour, evaluates the 
effectiveness of systems engineering through several case studies and interviews of 
industry users.  In addition he derives a systems engineering quality metric through 
interviews with program participants which he defines as the effectiveness of Systems 
Engineering Process implementation.  Based on the evaluation conducted Honour 
determines that the ideal quantity of systems engineering in a given program is 15 to 20% 
if well executed, and further his findings indicated that this was relatively independent of 
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performance against those plans however it cannot design the aircraft.  Systems 
engineering is a very powerful tool for improving program execution but it must be 
implemented in conjunction with an experienced team who can take advantage of the 
tools provided. 
 
Of the factors which adversely affect the cost performance of acquisition 
programs some are within the control of the contractor such as errors in evaluating 
program requirements, errors in estimating the initial program schedule and cost, errors in 
estimating the technical complexity of the program and inadequate program management 
while other such as program requirements and quantity changes are outside of the control 
of the control of the contractor.  As a developer of advanced systems one must be aware 
of the ever changing defense acquisition budget and realize that the DoD must prioritize 
its acquisition programs in order to achieve the desired capability for the warfighter while 
maintaining a portfolio that is within the allotted budget.  In light of this adverse climate 
contractors must take every possible action to ensure that program goals are met within 
the allotted budget and schedule.  The Systems Engineering Process provides many 
valuable tools for improving program success and the goal of the preceding evaluation 
was to show how aspects of Systems Engineering can be incorporated into the 
development program to counteract the previously identified drivers of cost growth and 




The preceding discussion has attempted to provide an overview of the 
Government Aircraft Acquisition Process with the goal of determining the primary 
drivers of cost increase in acquisition programs and methods for reducing or eliminating 
that growth.  The Defense Acquisition Process was introduced to provide background on 
the phases of an acquisition program as well as to highlight the key points and 
deliverables.  Aircraft Design was discussed with the goal of clarifying the basic process 
and the method through which the design is specified by the customer.  Cost Data on 
aircraft programs was evaluated extensively with the goal of determining the primary 
causes which drive increasing cost in aircraft programs as well as to identify any 
significant trends.  The results of the evaluation showed that the primary drivers of cost 
are Errors in Estimating, Technical Difficulty, Requirements Changes and Quantity 
Changes.  Further, trends were found to exist for cost growth of different system types 
and new programs as opposed to upgrades.  The discussion then moved to the topic of 
Nunn McCurdy Breaches where the criterion for and the results of a breach were clarified 
and data was provided to show historical trends.  From the GAO, the primary causes of 
Nunn McCurdy Breaches were Engineering and Design issues, schedule issues and 
revised estimates which coincided well with the previous evaluations of program data.  In 
addition, the data indicated a significant trend towards incurring breaches over the 12 
year period evaluated.  
Individual case studies were then considered in order to provide a detailed view of 
3 different aircraft development programs.  The F/A-22 Fighter was evaluated to show 
that high technical risk in conjunction with program management issues can drive cost 
while in contrast the F/A-18 E/F program showed that low technical risk and effective 
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program management can result in a successful program.  The F/A-22 experienced close 
to 80% Development Cost Growth and unit cost approximately tripled while the overall 
program cost was ultimately reduced.  It should be noted though, that while the quantity 
adjustments allowed the DoD to contain the total program cost the final delivery will only 
be for 1/3 of the original planned quantity of aircraft.  In stark contrast, the F/A-18 E/F 
came in on budget and schedule.  The VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Program was also 
evaluated to show the impact of inadequate requirements definition and systems 
engineering.  This program, planned as a mod to an existing airframe much like the F/A-
18 E/F, was ultimately cancelled after it was projected to double in cost by completion. 
The recommendations section offers a brief overview of the budgeting process 
and its impact on requirements and quantity changes which are, in many respects, outside 
of the control of the contractor.  A discussion is then provided for the methods in which 
the systems engineering process can be utilized by contractors to correct the deficiencies 
identified which ultimately result in cost growth.  Overall the intent of this study is to 
show how improved techniques for managing programs, meeting customer requirements 
and improving cost estimates can be implemented to manage cost growth when 
implemented in an effective engineering organization.  Further data was then provided 
from a study by INCOSE to show how increasing the budget for project definition and 
management through systems engineering can result in improved cost performance.  
The ultimate goal of this study is to show that risk can and should be managed 





Appendix A – Resources for the Defense Acquisition System 
Topic Source 
Acquisition Procedure Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
Work Breakdown Structures 
(WBS) 
MIL-HDBK-881A, Work Breakdown Structure 
Configuration Management ANSI/EIA-649, National Consensus Standard for 
Configuration Management 
MIL-HDBK-61A, Configuration Management 
Earned Value Management 
System 
ANSI/EIA-748A, Earned Value Management Systems 
DoD Earned Value Management Implementation Guide 
Systems Engineering NASA SE Handbook 
Systems Engineering Plan Preparation Guide 
Risk Management Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition 
Manufacturing and Quality MIL-HDBK-896, "Manufacturing and Quality Program 
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